FSS-DECO Seminar: “From Design to Disclosure” by Prof. Kun ZHANG, 30/10/2024, 14:00 @E21B-G002
社會科學學院經濟學系講座:張堃教授,30/10/2024,14:00 @E21B-G002
Seminar on Economics
From Design to Disclosure
Speaker: Prof. Kun ZHANG
Lecturer
School of Economics
University of Queensland
Abstract:
This paper studies sender-receiver games in which the sender discloses evidence to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. Our framework encompasses monopoly pricing, bargaining over policies, and insurance markets. In this setting, we characterize the full set of equilibrium payoffs. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be supported in an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Hence, in the contracting environments that we study, our analysis offers a microfoundation for information design and suggests that the gap between information design and disclosure is negligible.
Date: 30 October 2024 (Wednesday)
Time: 14:00-15:15
Language: English
Venue: E21B-G002
All are welcome!
Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Macau
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