FSS-DECO Seminar: “From Design to Disclosure” by Prof. Kun ZHANG, 30/10/2024, 14:00 @E21B-G002

社會科學學院經濟學系講座:張堃教授,30/10/2024,14:00 @E21B-G002

Seminar on Economics

 

From Design to Disclosure

Speaker: Prof. Kun ZHANG

Lecturer

School of Economics

University of Queensland

 

Abstract:

This paper studies sender-receiver games in which the sender discloses evidence to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. Our framework encompasses monopoly pricing, bargaining over policies, and insurance markets. In this setting, we characterize the full set of equilibrium payoffs. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be supported in an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Hence, in the contracting environments that we study, our analysis offers a microfoundation for information design and suggests that the gap between information design and disclosure is negligible.

 

Date: 30 October 2024 (Wednesday)

Time: 14:00-15:15

Language: English

Venue: E21B-G002

 

All are welcome!

Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Macau

 

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