FSS-DECO Seminar: “Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions” by Prof. Yu ZHOU, 20/03/2024, 14:00@E21B-G002

社會科學學院經濟學系講座：周愚教授, 20/03/2024, 14:00@E21B-G002

Seminar on Economics

 

“Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions”

 

Speaker: Prof. Yu ZHOU

Associate Professor,

Graduate School of Economics,

Nagoya University

 

Abstract:

We study the auction model of selling multiple heterogeneous objects in which (i) unit demand agents have utility functions accommodating wealth effects and (ii) prices can only be discretely adjusted. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE), a natural generalization of the Vickrey allocation to settings without assuming quasi-linearity, plays a central role in designing efficient and incentive-compatible auctions. Nevertheless, discrete prices do not always support the MPEs. We instead propose an efficient equilibrium notion, tight equilibrium, and calculate the upper and lower deviation bounds between any tight equilibrium price and the (unique) MPE price. We also develop a descending-price auction that finds a tight equilibrium in finitely many steps. We further introduce a new notion of incentive compatibility, compensating strategy-proofness, to measure the non-manipulability of our proposed auction in an approximate sense.

 

Date: 20 March 2024 (Wednesday)

Time: 14:00-15:15

Language: English

Venue: E21B-G002

 

All are welcome!

 

Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Macau