FSS-DECO Seminar: “Finding All Stable Matchings with Assignment Constraints” by Prof. Philip Ruane NEARY , 17/04/2024, 14:00 @E21B-G016

社會科學學院經濟學系講座：Philip Ruane NEARY教授, 17/04/2024, 14:00 @E21B-G016

Seminar on Economics

 

“Finding All Stable Matchings with Assignment Constraints”

 

Speaker: Prof. Philip Ruane NEARY

Lecturer,

Department of Economics,

Royal Holloway University of London

 

Abstract:

In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main contribution is an algorithm that determines when assignment constraints are compatible with stability. Whenever there is a stable matching that satisfies the assignment constraints, our algorithm outputs all of them (each in polynomial time per solution). This provides market designers with (i) a tool to test the feasibility of stable matchings subject to assignment constraints, and (ii) a separate tool to implement them.

 

Date: 17 April 2024 (Wednesday)

Time : 14:00-15:15

Language: English

Venue: E21B-G016

 

All are welcome!

Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Macau